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HABEAS CORPUS - PROCEDURAL PREREQUISITES - MOTION DENIED FOR 
FAILURE To APPEAL CONVICTION DESPITE FAILURE BEING ExcusABLE - Plain-
tiff was convicted of robbery in a federal district court and, although 
represented by counsel, failed to appeal within the statutory ten-day period. 
Three months later he filed a motion in the same court under section 2255 
of the judicial code1 to vacate the sentence on the ground that the conviction, 
because it was based on a coerced confession, was unconstitutionally ob-
tained without due process of law.2 The motion was denied3 and the 
denial affirmed,4 in the absence of any attempt to excuse the failure to ap-
peal. On reargument, plaintiff attempted to excuse his failure to appeal by 
alleging that neither the court nor his counsel advised him of his right to 
an appeal or that such appeal had to be taken within ten days.5 On re-
128 U.S.C. § 2255 (1958). This section provides that a prisoner in custody under 
sentence of a federal court may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, 
set aside or correct the sentence and that the motion shall be granted "if the court finds 
••• that there has been such a denial or infringement of the constitutional rights of the 
prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerable to collateral attack ..•• " For most purposes 
§ 2255 replaces habeas corpus which will not be entertained if the prisoner is authorized 
to apply for relief pursuant to this section unless the remedy by motion appears to be 
inadequate. Moreover, cases dealing with habeas corpus proceedings constitute authority 
to govern questions concerning the availability of a motion under § 2255, so far as here 
relevant. United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 219 (1952); United States v. Edwards, 152 
F. Supp. 179 (D.D.C. 1957); see also Parker, Limiting the Abuse of Habeas Corpus, 8 
F.R.D. 171, 175 (1949). See generally United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 (1954); 
Holtzoff, Collateral Review of Convictions in Federal Courts, 25 B.U.L. REv. 26 (1945); 
Peters, Collateral Attack by Habeas Corpus Upon Federal Judgments in Criminal Cases, 
23 WASH. L. REv. 87 (1948); Rogge &: Gordon, Habeas Corpus, Civil Rights and the 
Federal System, 20 U. CHI. L. REv. 509 (1953); Comment, 61 HARv. L. REv. 657 (1948). 
2 "[N]or shall any person ••. be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law .••• " U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
3 United States v. Hodges, 156 F. Supp. 313 (D.D.C. 1957). 
-i This original opinion, which appears as an appendix to the principal case, held 
that even if there had been a coerced confession which would constitute a denial of due 
process, failure to appeal precluded relief under § 2255 "in the complete absence of any 
attempt to excuse the failure to appeal. ••. " Principal case at 866. 
ti Plaintiff supported this allegation with two affidavits to the effect that he had been 
taken to jail immediately after sentence and was thus prevented from conferring with 
counsel in regard to an appeal. Principal case at 862. 
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argument before the court en bane, held, affirmed, three judges dissenting. 
Even if the failure to appeal was excusable, such failure precludes relief by 
motion under section 2255 since collateral attack may not be used as a sub-
stitute for an appeal. Hodges v. United States, 282 F.2d 858 (D.C. Cir. 1960). 
Section 2255 codifies the general rule that federal convictions are subject 
to collateral attack when based on an alleged6 violation of defendant's con-
stitutional rights.7 The majority opinion in the principal case, however, 
states it to be "the general rule that the admission of a confession at a plenary 
trial is not subject to attack under section 2255 on the ground that the confes-
sion was coerced."S No authority is cited in support of this purported "general 
rule" and none has been found. On the contrary, the federal appellate 
courts have uniformly condemned the use of coerced confessions although 
the rationale behind their condemnation has varied depending upon 
whether the conviction under attack was obtained in a federal or state 
court and upon whether the review was direct or collateral. The courts 
have, of jurisdictional necessity, decided both direct and collateral reviews 
of state convictions on constitutional grounds, and it is now well settled 
that the use by a state of a coerced confession violates the due process 
clause of the fourteenth amendment.9 Since appellate review of federal 
convictions need not rest on constitutional grounds, most reversals in federal 
cases have been based on either the rule of evidence which excludes coerced 
confessions as untrustworthy10 or the federal rule of evidence, established in 
McNabb v. United States,11 which excludes confessions obtained during an 
illegal detention before arraignment. The fifth amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination has also been cited in dictum in conjunction with 
the untrustworthy evidence rule as a makeweight ground for reversal on 
appeal of a few federal convictions involving coerced confessions.12 To 
date the Supreme Court has not been presented vvith a collateral attack of 
a federal conviction based upon a coerced confession which would, as do all 
state conviction cases, require constitutional grounds to support a reversal. 
6 In reaching its decision the court assumed, as it must, that the allegations were 
true. See, e.g., United States v. Rosenberg, 20D F.2d 666, 668 (2d Cir. 1952); United States 
v. Sturm, 180 F.2d 413, 414 (7th Cir. 1950). 
7 E.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (right to counsel); Counselman v. 
Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892) (self incrimination); In re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176 (1889) 
(double jeopardy); Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888) (right to jury trial); Ex parte 
Bain, 121 U.S. I (1887) (requirement of indictment). 
8 Principal case at 860. 
9 E.g., Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959); Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954); 
Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945); Brown v. 
Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). 
10 Ziang Sung Wan v. United States, 266 U.S. 1 (1924). See generally 3 'WIGMORE, 
EVIDENCE § 822 (3d ed. 1940). 
11318 U.S. 332 (1943). The McNabb rule is based, not on constitutional grounds, but 
rather on the Court's supervisory control over the federal judicial system. See generally 
Comment, 43 VA. L. REv. 915 (1957). 
12E.g., Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897); Purpura v. United States, 
262 Fed. 473, 475 (4th Cir. 1919). 
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The requisite constitutional basis should readily be found, however, either 
by reading the due process clause of the fifth amendment as coextensive 
with that of the fourteenth and then relying on the state conviction cases, 
or by squarely holding that the use of a coerced confession violates the self-
incrimination clause of the fifth amendment.1 3 It would appear, therefore, 
that the majority's position is in error and that the general rule permitting 
collateral attack of a conviction based on a denial of defendant's constitu-
tional rights should be applicable in the principal case. 
This general rule, however, is qualified by the requirement that the 
taking of an appeal is a condition precedent to seeking collateral relief on 
any grounds.14 The crucial issue in the principal case is whether an excep-
tion to this requirement may be made when the failure to appeal is ex-
cusable. The majority opinion answered in the negative. A significant 
number of federal habeas corpus cases have, however, overlooked or express-
ly excused the failure to appeal and permitted collateral attack notwith-
standing such failure.15 Three of these cases, in which federal convictions 
involving alleged denials of constitutional rights were not appealed, are 
pertinent and illustrative. Bowen v. Johnston16 raised the important and 
theretofore unsettled question whether the state or federal government had 
criminal jurisdiction over national parks. The Supreme Court expressly 
held that because of these "exceptional circumstances" the failure to appeal 
would be excused. Johnson v. Zerbst11 held that a hearing must be granted 
13 If this hypothesis is rejected the availability in federal courts of relief by collateral 
attack for a prisoner convicted by a coerced confession would depend on whether he had 
been convicted in a state or federal court; this would place the higher federal courts in 
the anomalous position of being able to correct state convictions but not those of their 
own lower courts. 
14 Sunal v. Large, 32 U.S. 174 (1947); Adams v. United States ex rel. l\IcCann, 317 
U.S. 269 (1942) (dictum); Glasgow v. Moyer, 225 U.S. 420 (1912); Harlan v. McGourin, 
218 U.S. 442 (1910). This failure-to-appeal rule was judicially created and is not part 
of the statutory language of § 2255. The common expression of the rule is that "habeas 
corpus proceedings may not be used as a substitute for appeal." 
15 The following cases expressly excused the failure to appeal from state convictions 
and permitted collateral attack: Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329 (1941) (pica of guilty and 
no counsel); Craynor v. Gonzales, 226 F.2d 83 (9th Cir. 1955) (although no state appeal 
perfected, state court had allowed petition for habeas corpus); Downer v. Dunaway, 53 F.2d 
586 (5th Cir. 1931) (alleged mob domination of trial and impossibility of filing for 
appeal until after date set for e.xecution); Yohyowan v. Luce, 291 Fed. 425 (E.D. Wash. 
1923) (state trial court had no jurisdiction over petitioner, an Indian, and petitioner had 
no money for an appeal). In the following cases federal convictions were under collateral 
attack and hearings were granted in spite of the fact that no appeal had been taken: 
Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942) (facts concerning alleged coerced plea of guilty 
were dehors the record and therefore could not have been corrected on appeal); Bowen 
v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19 (1939) (federal trial court allegedly without jurisdiction); John-
son v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (alleged unconstitutional denial of counsel); Council v. 
Clemmer, 165 F.2d 249 (D.C. Cir. 1947) (same); Reid v. Sanford, 42 F. Supp. 300 (N.D. 
Ga. 1941) (same). The significance of these cases lies not in whether petitioner was 
successful in the collateral attack of his conviction, but in the fact that despite there 
being no appeal, a collateral attack was permitted. The principal case and the present 
analysis involve only the question of whether a hearing will be allowed. 
16 306 U.S. 19 (1939). 
11 304 U.S. 458 (1938). 
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where petitioner alleged that he had been deprived of his constitutional 
right to counsel since the absence of counsel was sufficient to excuse the 
failure to appeal.18 Perhaps the most significant case is Council v. Clem-
mer.19 There petitioner had counsel during his trial but argued that his 
failure to appeal was excusable because he had relied upon his attorney's 
assurance that an appeal would be prosecuted and that he did not learn 
of the attorney's failure to appeal until after the time limit had elapsed.20 
The above cases show that under certain circumstances the failure to appeal 
may be excused and a collateral attack permitted. The holding in the prin-
cipal case that even an "excusable" failure to appeal bars a motion under 
section 2255 is, therefore, demonstrably in error.21 
The questions remain, however, what will be sufficient to excuse the 
failure to appeal and whether the facts in the principal case bring it within 
the excusable category. As the above three cases suggest, the failure-to-
appeal rule appears to be only one of several factors which courts have 
considered in deciding whether to permit collateral attack when there 
has been no appeal. Each case involved, as a second factor, either an im-
portant unsettled question of law which the court felt should be decided or 
an alleged denial of a basic constitutional right: in Bowen, an important 
question of federal-state criminal jurisdiction; in Zerbst, an alleged viola-
tion of the sixth amendment right to counsel; in Council, an argument 
that denial of counsel at the arraignment violated the sixth amendment. 
Another factor is the balance which must be struck between the quest for 
justice on the one side and finality of judicial proceedings and the econo-
mizing of the courts' time on the other.22 The Zerbst and Council cases 
18 In discussing petitioner's failure to appeal, Mr. Justice Black said, "Urging that -
after conviction -he was unable to obtain a lawyer; was ignorant of the proceedings 
to obtain new trial or appeal and the time limits governing both; and that he did not 
possess the requisite skill or knowledge properly to conduct an appeal, he says that it was 
- as a practical matter -impossible for him to obtain relief by appeal. If these conten-
tions be true in fact, it necessarily follows that no legal procedural remedy is available 
to grant relief for a violation of constitutional rights, unless the courts protect petitioner's 
right by habeas corpus." Id. at 467. 
19 165 F.2d 249 (D.C. Cir. 1947). 
20 In granting the hearing the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, 
the same court which in the present case holds that even an excusable failure to appeal 
bars collateral relief, said, "The time for appeal is relatively brief, and we have accepted 
appellant's explanation of his failure to appeal from the judgment of the trial court in 
order that the more substantial contentions raised herein may be given proper attention." 
Id. at 251. (Emphasis added.) 
21 The majority opinion places heavy reliance on United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 
220 (1960), which held that since the filing of a notice of appeal within ten days is a 
jurisdictional requirement the period for taking an appeal may not be enlarged although 
the failure to appeal was excusable. The dissenting opinion, principal case at 862-63, 
seems to be correct in insisting that this direct appeal case is not authority for denying a 
collateral attack hearing. On the contrary, the very purpose of habeas corpus is to ter-
minate wrongful detention resulting from errors which were not or could not be corrected 
on appeal. See Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942). 
22 These institutional expediencies seem to have greatly influenced the court in the 
principal case. Principal case at 860. 
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demonstrate that whether the petitioner had any real, practical opportu-
nity to take an appeal is the final, potent factor in such a decision. The 
court in the principal case was in error when it treated the failure-to-appeal 
rule as an invariable bar to collateral attack rather than as a surmountable 
hurdle. And, if the proper test of balancing all the relevant considerations 
is applied, the court appears also to have reached the wrong result. Facts 
were alleged which, if true, indicated not only the denial of a basic consti-
tutional right and the presence of an important question of law, but also 
indicated the absence of any real opportunity to appeal. Under such cir-
cumstances the remaining considerations of economy of judicial time and 
the finality of legal proceedings must surely bow to the very real possibility 
of an unconstitutional deprivation of human liberty. 
Harvey 0. Mierke, Jr. 
